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Abstract
Beginning in the seventeenth century, numerous attempts were made to reach a very high
latitude or even the North Pole. One of the more successful of these was the Italian Arctic
expedition of 1899–1900, led by Luigi Amedeo di Savoia (Duke of the Abruzzi). Using two
successively returning support parties, di Savoia’s second-in-command, Captain Umberto
Cagni’s party eventually reached 86°34’Nnorth of their base in the Franz Josef Land archipelago
before retreating due to lack of supplies. The second support party also returned safely to the
base from 83°16’N. However, the first support party, led by Lieutenant Francesco Querini, dis-
appeared without a trace after returning southwards from 82°32’N. Although previous studies
have cited starvation from lack of food supplies or accidents as the potential causes of their
disappearance, the extant literature does not provide any deeper analyses to explain these
events. This study explores the hypothesis that the first support party in fact turned back from
a much more westerly position than they thought. This, in combination with an untimely bliz-
zard that prevented travelling for several days, most likely made it impossible for Querini and
his two men to return to base before their limited supplies ran out.
Introduction
Considering the long history of Arctic explorations since the fifteenth century, the expedition
led byWilliam E. Parry to Spitsbergen by the Norwegian Royal Navy in 1827 was the first organ-
ised polar sledging expedition with a serious aim of reaching the farthest northern point over the
Arctic pack ice ever attempted. Parry used man-hauled ‘boat sledges’ to reach 82°45’N north of
the Seven Islands in the Svalbard archipelago (Parry, 1828). The record stood for almost 50 years
until Albert Hastings Markham reached 83°20’N in Lincoln Sea to the north of Canada’s
Ellesmere Island (Nares, 1878). Markham, under the leadership of George Strong Nares, used
the same logistical approach as Parry. A few years later, Americans James Lockwood and David
Brainard, from the Adolphus Greely-led Lady Franklin Bay Expedition (1881–1884), travelled
with dog sledges along the west coast of Greenland in 1882 and eventually reached 83°24’N
before being forced to return (Greely, 1886). This record stood until Norwegians Fridtjof
Nansen andHjalmar Johansenmade a northwards dash in 1895 fromNansen’s ship Fram, drift-
ing across a solidly frozen Arctic basin. Nansen and Johansen reached 86°14’N on skis using dog
sledges before the harsh icy conditions forced their retreat (Nansen, 1897). Towards the end of
the century, a new record in reaching the northernmost point in the Arctic was created by
Umberto Cagni, the second-in-command of the Italian Arctic Expedition of 1899–1900 and
led by Luigi Amedeo di Savoia, the Duke of the Abruzzi. This record was created before
Frederick A. Cook’s mendacious claim of reaching the North Pole with two Inuit men in
1908 (Cook, 1913; Henderson, 2005); and ignores Robert E. Peary’s impossible claim of having
reached 87°06 0N during his 1905–1906 expedition (see Herbert, 1989). Before Cagni’s final
dash, two of his supporting parties had already turned back. Hence, Cagni used a similar logis-
tical approach as Captain Robert F. Scott during his march up the Beardmore Glacier towards
the South Pole in December 1911. Using dog sledges, Cagni’s expedition team travelled north of
the Franz Josef Land archipelago to reach 86°34’N on 25 April 1900, before returning due to lack
of supplies (Cagni, 1903).
These Arctic expeditions involved horrific weather conditions and dangers amidst
harsh polar winters with inadequate food and shelter, and unsophisticated equipment.
Surprisingly, most members of these expeditions managed to return alive despite these con-
ditions; however, some did not. For example, most of Greely’s crewmembers, including
Lockwood, perished in camp from starvation, hypothermia, and drowning during the winter
of 1883–1884 (Greely, 1886). This paper focusses on the first returning three-member sup-
port party from the 1899–1900 Italian Arctic expedition, led by Lieutenant Francesco
Querini, that were lost in the field (di Savoia, 1903). Because this support party literally dis-
appeared without a trace, it is impossible to know for a fact what happened to them. In his
later expedition narrative, di Savoia simply assumed that ‘some accidental mishap’ must
have occurred (di Savoia, 1903, p.346). After realising that Querini’s group had gone
missing, he considered whether and where exactly he should
send a search party. Finally, deciding to send a party eastward
from his base camp in Teplitz Bay on Prince Rudolf Island,
despite assuming (correctly, as it turned out) that they would
not be able to find anything (di Savoia, 1903, p.248).
To the best of my knowledge, the extant literature does not con-
tain studies attempting to cast further light on the disappearance of
Querini and his two crewmembers. In his 1913 review of the then
recent race to the poles, Logan Marshall recalled the incident
almost poetically:
How, or when, or where, they hadmet their end, no one could form any opin-
ion. A break in the ice may have precipitated them into a channel; cold may
have overcome them as they slept; moving hummocks may have over-
whelmed them, or a sudden snow-storm may have caused them to lose their
direction, and have led them into dangers they were not able to escape.When
no trace could be found of them, and no vestige of their outfit discovered on
the ice, or the islands, there was only one thing the survivors could realize,
and that was that their comrades had gone out of the world in silence, in
mystery and in sacrifice to the knowledge of humanity. (Marshall,
1913, p.312)
Marshall was correct in the sense that their disappearance has vari-
ous possible causes. The hypothesis that Querini’s party probably
starved to death during their return journey has been proposed by
some previous authors (e.g. Albanov, 2000; Bryce, 1910; Fiala,
1906), albeit on a speculative level without any supporting analysis.
Indeed, without any physical evidence, it is impossible to deduce
with complete certainty what happened to Querini’s party.
One approach to gain a better understanding of historical polar
expedition outcomes is to use more modern scientific approaches.
For example, Stroud (1987) showed through the application of
modern nutritional science that an inadequate diet was the most
likely factor in Captain Robert Falcon Scott’s demise during his
return march from the South Pole in the Terra Nova expedition of
1912. Lantz (2018) also showed through the application of optimi-
zation algorithms that Scott’s depot strategy for the southwards
journey from the Beardmore glacier during Terra Nova expedition
was far from optimal in terms of the distance that the last party
could reach based on their total consumption of supplies.
This study aimed to analyse the weather experiences of the
expedition party members of the Italian Arctic Expedition of
1899–1900 by considering modern scientific knowledge about
Arctic ice drift to shed light on the loss of the first returning sup-
port party. The crewmembers’ personal accounts of their journey
were also used along with secondary data to analyse their prior
knowledge of the geographical conditions of the Arctic before
undertaking their journey.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. First, con-
temporary knowledge about Arctic ice drift and its causes are sum-
marised. Second, the 1899–1900 Italian Arctic Expedition is briefly
reviewed. Finally, the narratives by expedition members Cagni and
Cavalli Molinelli are analysed to provide a conclusion.
The Arctic ice drift
Ice was the primary physical obstacle for early explorers attempt-
ing to reach the North Pole or its vicinity. The presence of ice often
blocked the northwards progress of ships towards the pole.
Furthermore, when attempting to sledge over the ice, ice drifts often
moved the expeditions in undesirable directions. The first systematic
observations on ice drift were probably made by William E. Parry.
During his attempt to reach theNorth Pole in 1827, Parry was highly
frustrated with the southerly movement of the ice in his northwards
journey from Svalbard (Parry, 1828). He also noticed a westerly
element in the ice drift (e.g. Parry, 1828, p.107), but as it did not
directly interfere with his desire to reach further north, he did not
mention it nearly as frequently in his narrative. Arctic ice drift also
threatened other early polar expeditions. For example, it was the
main reason why the engineer S. A. Andrée and his men perished
during the attempted return march over the ice after a failed attempt
to reach the North Pole in a hydrogen balloon in 1897 (Lantz, 2019).
Contemporary scientific studies have established two primary
components of an Arctic ice drift pattern (Macdonald, Hammer, &
Fyfe, 2005). The first is a clockwise circulation in the Beaufort Sea,
north of Alaska (when viewed from above the North Pole) called
the Beaufort Gyre. The second component is the Transpolar Drift
Stream, which is a direct movement of sea ice from the Laptev Sea
north of Siberia towards the Eurasian Basin, exiting into the North
Atlantic between Svalbard and Greenland (see Fig. 1). The general
pattern shows slight yearly variations between the anticyclonic
(strong clockwise winds over the Beaufort Gyre region caused
by high atmospheric pressure; labelled ‘Low Index’ in Fig. 1)
and cyclonic conditions (the opposite atmospheric conditions;
labelled ‘High Index’ in Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Components of Arctic ice drift patterns: Beaufort Gyre and the transpolar drift
stream. Source: Macdonald et al. (2005, p.26)
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The Transpolar Drift Stream was a prerequisite for Fridtjof
Nansen’s successful drift across the Arctic basin in Fram in
1893–1896. The Norwegian meteorologist and professor Henrik
Mohn (see Mohn, 1887) was the first to hypothesise this ice drift
pattern based on the discovery of the debris of the Jeannette on the
southwest coast of Greenland several years after the ship’s wreck-
age in 1881 on the ice off the north Siberian coast (Lytzen, 1885).
TrustingMohn’s analysis, Nansen decided to take advantage of this
drift pattern in his ensuing Fram expedition (Nansen, 1893).
Although Nansen still believed in 1893 that sea currents were the pri-
mary propellers of ice across the polar basin, he (correctly) deduced,
based on his experiences during the expedition, that the wind in fact
was the main determinant of the Arctic ice drift. He also correctly
noted that the ice tended to drift somewhat to the right of the prevail-
ing wind direction due to the Coriolis force (Nansen, 1902).
Given this study’s aim, di Savoia and his crew’s knowledge
about the Arctic ice drift is critical to analysing their expedition
strategy. Before embarking on the 1899–1900 expedition, di
Savoia had thoroughly discussed his plans with Nansen, who had
recently returned from his Fram expedition. Therefore, the Italians
were aware of the long-term westerly element of the ice drift in
the area from where they would venture towards the North Pole
(di Savoia, 1903). To offset the ice drift, Cagni tried to hold a gen-
eral true NNE course (i.e. he marched towards the magnetic
north) during his outwards march over the ice (Cagni, 1903).
He also advised Querini and Cavalli Molinelli to trend towards
the southeast during their respective return southwards marches
(di Savoia & Cagni, 1901). However, it is unclear whether di
Savoia or Cagni realised the strength of the short-term relation-
ship between the wind and ice drift.
Scientific knowledge about the causes of Arctic ice drift has dra-
matically improved over time (e.g. Macdonald et al., 2005; Spreen,
Kwok, & Menemenlis, 2011; Uotila, 2001). We know now that the
direction and speed of the wind accounts for almost 70% of the
short-term sea ice motion, which explains how the ice drifts on
a daily to weekly basis (National Snow and Ice Data Center,
2020). Hence, taken together, all other explanatory factors of ice
drift (e.g. currents, tides and the thickness of the ice) have less than
half the explanatory power of wind. In addition, this correlation
seems stronger for the Transpolar Drift Stream than for the
Beaufort Gyre (Kimura & Wakatsuchi, 2000). Hence, wind obser-
vation seems to be a particularly reliable method of estimating the
ice drift to north of Franz Josef Land. This strong relationship
between wind and sea ice drift presents a useful rule of thumb:
sea ice that drifts freely moves at approximately 2% of the wind
speed, slightly less when the ice is smooth/thick and slightly more
when the ice is rough/thin, and approximately 30° to the right of
the wind direction (National Snow and Ice Data Center, 2020).
Thus, if the average wind speed is 10 m/s during a 24 hour period,
Arctic ice can be expected to drift at a speed of approximately 0.2
m/s during the same period, moving the ice in the area by approx-
imately 15–20 km somewhat to the right of the wind direction.
Some older studies also suggest that in the past, the sea ice may
in the Arctic may have been slightly less responsive to wind, per-
haps closer to 1% than the 2%mentioned above (Tschudi, Meier, &
Stewart, 2020).
Review of the Italian expedition
Despite being only 25 years old, Luigi Amedeo di Savoia, the Duke
of the Abruzzi, was already an experienced mountaineer and
explorer when he outlined his Polar expedition plan in 1898.
With the knowledge of the methods used in previous successful
long-distance Arctic sledge journeys made by, for example,
Wrangell, Peary, and Nansen, he ordered 120 Siberian dogs
and travelled to Norway to purchase a suitable ship (di Savoia,
1903, p.21). Jason was the best available ship at the time (the same
ship used by Nansen in his 1888 expedition to Greenland), which
di Savoia substantially upgraded and renamed Stella Polare—the
Pole star (di Savoia, 1903, p.24). Before the expedition, di Savoia
held several meetings with Nansen, who advised him regarding
logistics, equipment, and other aspects of the expedition based
on his experiences from the recent Fram expedition (di Savoia,
1903, pp.39–40). Di Savoia’s overall plan was to sail as far north
as possible through the Franz Josef Land archipelago, spend the
winter at a suitable location, and then travel northwards over
the ice using dog sledges to reach the highest possible latitude
or perhaps even the North Pole itself (di Savoia, 1903, p.vii).
The expedition crew comprised 11 Italian and 9 Norwegian
crewmembers when leaving Archangel on 13 July 1899, before
steaming north towards Franz Josef Land (di Savoia, 1903, p.49).
After visiting Frederick Jackson’s base camp at Cape Flora, they tried
to force their waynorthwards throughNightingale Sound, but the ice
forced them to retreat (di Savoia, 1903, p.67). Di Savoia decided to
attempt reaching the Queen Victoria Sea through a route west of
Franz Josef Land, but the ice prevented them from reaching
Alexandra Land. He then chose to return to Nightingale Sound
and could eventually penetrate the ice there (di Savoia, 1903, p.84).
On 6 August, during their northwards journey into open water
through the British Channel, they encountered a sealing ship called
Capella close to Eaton Island. This ship had the American explorer
WalterWellman with his crew on board, whowere returning home
after a failed attempt to reach the North Pole from Franz Josef
Land. The crews socialised for a while on Stella Polare before their
ships continued in opposite directions (di Savoia, 1903, p.86).
Captain Olaf Støkken of Capella did not know that this would
be the last time he saw his son, Henrik Alfred Støkken, the engineer
of Stella Polare who disappeared with Querini and Ollier during
the detachment’s return from the Italian sledge journey.
Eventually, the expedition reached Prince Rudolf Island on
8 August with relative ease—the ice conditions were unusually
favourable (di Savoia, 1903, p.90). Figure 2 shows the route to
the Prince Rudolf Island through the archipelago. The visibility
on the day of their arrival was perfect. Therefore, di Savoia could
immediately reject the existence of Petermann Land to the north
and King Oscar Land to the west (di Savoia, 1903, p.96), both of
which Julius von Payer hadmentioned sighting on amisty day dur-
ing his sledge journey through Franz Joseph Land 25 years before
(Payer, 1876). Di Savoia’s crew anchored at Teplitz Bay, the north-
ernmost bay of Prince Rudolf Island’s western coast at approxi-
mately 81°47’N 58°E, with the idea of spending the winter there.
However, when the ice pressure severely damaged the ship, they
had to establish a permanent tent-based camp ashore on the
nearby beach (di Savoia, 1903, p.130).
After spending the first part of the winter in relative tranquillity,
the crew began preparations for the northwards journey. The food
rations resembled those used in Greely’s expedition but with a
larger proportion of carbohydrates and a slightly smaller propor-
tion of protein. In terms of weight, the daily ration per crewmem-
ber was almost 20% larger than that used by Greely’s crew (di
Savoia, 1903, p.180). Some equipment, such as sledges and kayaks,
were similar to those used by Nansen a few years before, but in
other cases, such as the tents, di Savoia relied on his own experience
(di Savoia, 1903, pp.182–187).
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As a result of a winter excursion, di Savoia had to amputate
parts of his two fingers due to frostbite. This made him unfit to
lead the sledge journey towards the pole. Thus, Captain
Umberto Cagni was assigned the command of the northern
march instead (di Savoia, 1903, p.190). Cagni was the obvious
choice, not only because he was second-in-command but also
because he was tough as nails and extremely loyal to di
Savoia. The northern party set out on 20 February 1900, which
proved to be too early in the season. Consequently, they were
forced to retreat after a few days because of the intense cold, sim-
ilar to Amundsen during his Antarctic expedition in 1911. Three
weeks later, on 11March, Cagni set out again, straight out on the
pack ice from Prince Rudolf Island, with 9 crewmembers (all
Italians, except the Norwegian engineer Støkken), 13 sledges,
and 102 dogs as his main party (di Savoia, 1903, pp.211–212).
Three Norwegians provided additional assistance during the
first two days.
The overall logistical plan was as follows: a three-member
detachment would first return after approximately two weeks with
a sledge, a few dogs, and with just enough supplies that would
enable them to return to the base. A second detachment would
return after another two weeks in a similar manner (Cagni,
1903, p.350). This would leave the final three-member party with
optimal conditions for their northwards journey. Because they
knew they would be travelling on moving ice all the time, depot
laying was not an option; all supplies needed to be brought along
the sledges.
Cagni decided each returning group’s composition after observ-
ing the team members’ performance member during the march—
the general idea was that the least fit members would comprise the
returning detachments. Cagni’s plan was largely implemented after
a tenth member, Støkken, was added to the crew before the depar-
ture (Cagni, 1903, p. 392). Støkken would join the first returning
party, and after another team member was transferred from the
first returning detachment to the final group (Cagni, 1903,
p.394). The first detachment (Lieutenant Francesco Querini with
Støkken and alpine guide Felice Ollier) returned from 82°32’N
on 23 March with 10 days’ supplies (Cagni, 1903, p. 612; di
Savoia, 1903, p.245). The second detachment (Dr Achille Cavalli
Molinelli with the sailor Giacomo Cardenti and alpine guide
Cipriano Savoie) returned from 83°16’Non 31March with 18 days’
supplies (Cagni, 1903, p. 612; di Savoia, 1903, p.245). The reason
for sending the support parties back somewhat earlier than origi-
nally scheduled was to save rations for the extra man in the final
group (Cagni, 1903, p.419). The final party (Cagni with the sailor
Simone Canepa and alpine guides Giuseppe Petigax and Alessio
Fenoillet) continued northwards and covered substantial daily dis-
tances on relatively plain ice, after which they were eventually
forced to return from 86°34’N on 25 April due to lack of supplies
(di Savoia, 1903, p.345). Cagni’s party returned to the base on 23
June after a horrific struggle against the westerly ice drift. Querini’s
detachment did not return and disappeared without a trace, and
Cavalli Molinelli’s group returned to Prince Rudolf Island on 18
April. Figure 3 shows the route reported by Cagni (1903).
Fig. 2. Stella Polare’s route towards Prince Rudolf Island. Source: di Savoia (1903)
4 B. Lantz
After Cagni’s return to Prince Rudolf Island, di Savoia immedi-
ately began preparing for the expedition’s return journey. Stella
Polare was repaired and extricated from ice using explosives (di
Savoia, 1903, p.304). On 16 August, they sailed away from
Teplitz Bay (di Savoia, 1903, p.321). At this time, di Savoia still
had a faint hope that the missing detachment might have ended
up at Cape Flora, the only known provisions depot in Frans
Josef Land (di Savoia, 1903, p.340). Upon reaching Cape Flora
two weeks later, they found no trace of Querini and team. Stella
Polare eventually reached Tromsø in Norway on 6 September
Fig. 3. Captain Cagni’s northern sledge journey route. Source: Cagni (1903)
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without anymajor events en route. Despite their failure to reach the
North Pole and the loss of three team members, the expedition
garnered international attention both for di Savoia and Italy
(Cauli, 2019).
Analysis
The expedition team departed from Teplitz Bay on the morning
of 11 July, straight out on the ice. The first week’s marches covered
an average daily distance of approximately 7 geographical miles
(13 km), which was good but not impressive in comparison to
other expeditions at the time. As mentioned earlier, Cagni and
his team generally marched towards the magnetic north (Cagni,
1903:404) on their outwards journey, effectively travelling approx-
imately in aNNE direction over the ice, because themagnetic decli-
nation at the time was slightly above 20°E (Thébault et al., 2015).
The idea was to compensate for the long-termwesterly ice drift that
Cagni knew they would be exposed to, based on the mean drift
experienced by Fram (Cagni, 1903, p.404).
Somewhat surprisingly, Cagni did not seem to have observed
his longitude during the northern journey until reaching his far-
thest north camp, located at 86°34’N and 64°30’E, which was
slightly to the east of Prince Rudolf Island and 20 geographical
miles (37 km) farther north than Nansen’s prior record. His nar-
rative from the outward journey imply, somewhat surprisingly,
that he was not too worried about being unable to determine his
longitude for a long time. One reason for this may be that
Cagni was unaware of the rather frequent short-term variations
in the expected westerly ice drift in the area. In addition, Cagni
was mostly concerned about the latitude during the northwards
journey, under the assumption that his general rule of thumb of
maintaining an approximate NNE direction would be satisfactory
to offset the long-term westerly ice drift in the area. He only needed
precise longitudinal measurements in his returnmarch to reach the
base camp on Rudolf Island. Hence, Cagni made several longi-
tudinal observations during the latter part of his southwards
journey.
After the first week of the northwards march, Cagni’s crew
faced three days of continual and strong approximately easterly
winds during 18–20 March (Cagni, 1903, pp.414–419), when a
storm was followed by a fresh breeze. A storm typically has a wind
speed of approximately 30 m/s, whereas a fresh breeze has a wind
speed of approximately 10 m/s (Smyth, Jackson, & Cooper, 2013).
Hence, the average wind speed during the three days of strong and
continual approximately easterly winds was probably close to
20 m/s. The general assumption that sea ice moves at 2% of the
wind speed indicates that the approximate drift speed at the time
was approximately 0.4 m/s or 19 geographical miles (35 km) per
day. Thus, a rough but reasonable estimation is that the strong
easterly winds during those three days moved Cagni and his crew
approximately 55–60 geographical miles (102–111 km) in a west-
erly direction. However, as mentioned earlier, the Arctic Sea ice
was probably slightly less responsive to the wind during the time
of the Italian expedition than at present. Therefore, by conservative
estimates, the westwards shift of the ice during 18–20 March 1900
may have been slightly less, perhaps 30–35 geographical miles (56–
65 km). In any case, the crew was likely much further to the west on
the 21 March than they were aware of at the time.
A similar wind-based drift struck Robert E. Peary’s expedition
during his attempt to reach the North Pole from Ellesmere Island
in the Canadian Arctic in 1906. During six days of continuous
westerly gale that was strong enough to prevent travel, their ice floe
drifted eastwards by approximately 70 geographical miles (130
km), while Peary and his crew were stuck in their camp slightly
north of 85°N (‘Pearys own story of his farthest north dash’,
1906). Unlike the Italians six years earlier, Peary could observe
his longitude both before and immediately after the gale, giving
him sufficient idea of what had happened to eventually choose
another route back south.
After the third day of the outwards march, Cagni no longer
reported the bearings of the capes on Prince Rudolf Island in his
narrative. In fact, his narrative does not mention anything about
southwards views until 21 March, when he supposedly sighted
the outline of Prince Rudolf Island to their south (Cagni, 1903,
p.420). Cavalli Molinelli (1903, p.644) also mentioned this sighting
in his narrative. However, given the Earth’s curvature, Prince
Rudolf Island would not have been visible at the distance covered
so far. A formula for calculating the distance to the visible horizon
D for a spectator at a height h above the earth’s surface, disregard-
ing atmospheric refraction, is D = (2 × R × h þ h2)1/2, where R
represents the earth’s radius (Lynch, 2008). If R ≈ 6 370 km and
the height h = 0.461 km (the highest elevation on Prince Rudolf
Island), the distance to the horizon for a person standing at high-
est point on Prince Rudolf Island is D = (2 × 6370 × 0.461 þ
0.4612)1/2= 76,6 km, which corresponds with approximately 41
geographical miles. Under standard atmospheric conditions,
the effect of refraction increases the distance to the visible horizon
by up to 9% (Vollmer, 2020), which implies that from a distance
of 45 geographical miles (83 km) or above, not even the highest
point of the Prince Rudolf Island would be visible, even under
perfect visibility. The approximate distance between Prince
Rudolf Island and Cagni’s party on the ice at the time was approx-
imately 45 geographical miles (di Savoia, 1903, p.341. Therefore,
even after considering the refraction, Cagni’s party could not have
sighted the outline of Prince Rudolf Island to their south on 21
March, even if they had been directly to its north, because it would
have been too far away and thereby below the horizon. Thus, they
must have seen something else—most likely a hummock or some
other sort of ice formation. It is not uncommon to envision the
shapes of non-existent lands polar regions. Julius Payer’s alleged
sightings of Petermann Land and King Oscar Land from Prince
Rudolf Island in 1874 are good examples (Payer, 1876).
Cagni decided that the first party to return would comprise
Querini, Ollier, and Støkken—the last because he was not
Italian and the other two for health reasons (Cagni, 1903,
p.420). On the morning of 23 March, they began their return jour-
ney from 82°32’N with provisions for 10 days (di Savoia, 1903,
p.245), which, at full rations, would last for two days less than
the ones used to travel from their base to their current location.
Hence, when they began their return march they had a negative
margin for navigational errors or unforeseen events that could
have prevented their journey. They were never to be seen again.
On the evening of 23 March, after the first detachment’s depar-
ture, Cagni began speculating, without yet having made any longi-
tudinal observations during their northwards march, that they
might have deviated west from their course. Hence, what looked like
the outline of an island to their south two days ago, might not have
been Prince Rudolf Island at all (Cagni, 1903, p.424). However,
Querini’s party had already begun their return journey, convinced
that they were on the same meridian as their base in Teplitz Bay.
Neither Querini, Ollier, and Støkken’s remains nor anything in
their gear have ever been found, hence, their traceless disappear-
ance suggests that they perished on ice rather than on shore. As
Querini started his journey with the idea that Prince Rudolf
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Island was directly south of him, he might have discounted Cagni’s
advice to trend towards the southeast to compensate for the long-
term ice drift. If so, their situation was almost hopeless from the
outset. To make things worse, the upcoming blizzard from 1–4
April, which impeded the second returning detachment’s travel,
must have forced Querini’s party to remain in their tents as well,
even though their supplies had almost or entirely depleted by then.
In addition, Querini’s party did not have a boat with them—the
two boats that were brought were to be used by the second
returning party and the polar party. Cavalli Molinelli’s (1903,
pp.650–651) narrative of the second detachment’s return march
noted that during that year, the spring season was exceptionally
warm, with the ice around Prince Rudolf Island being broken
up with many leads. Thus, even if Querini’s managed to, against
all odds, come close to Prince Rudolf Island before running out
of supplies, they would probably have been blocked from coming
ashore by open water amidst the ice. Finally, similar to Cagni dur-
ing the same period of time, Cavalli Molinelli did not report having
been able to make any longitudinal observations during his return
march, which began from an even more northerly position than
Querini’s departure point. Therefore, one can reasonably assume
that Querini did not make any longitudinal observations either
and was most likely unaware of venturing too far to the west, until
it was too late.
On 28 March, Cagni noted a latitude of 82°58’N, which was 50
geographical miles (93 km) south of his rather conservative esti-
mate based on dead reckoning, all due to the ice drift. He did
not record any thoughts about possible shifts in the longitude at
this point. In fact, on 30 March he reported his inability to deter-
mine his longitude based on solar observation since they had left
Teplitz Bay. Hence, he could not have known at that point if, or
how much, they had drifted off their original meridian since they
last sighted Prince Rudolf Island.
The second supporting party comprising Dr Cavalli Molinelli,
Savoie, and Cardenti began their return march from 83°16’N in the
morning of 31 March, carrying provisions for 18 days (di Savoia,
1903, p.245). Because they had travelled 20 days to reach that posi-
tion, they too had a negative margin for navigational errors or
unforeseen events. Meanwhile, Cagni continued to steer north-
wards with his polar party comprising Petigax, Fenoillet,
Canepa, and himself. At this point, they were probably still much
farther to the west than they assumed because, since 18–20 March,
there were no strong winds as that could have substantially shifted
the ice pack. However, the first four days of April presented con-
tinual strong winds (mostly westerly winds) with blizzard condi-
tions that prevented travelling for both Cagni’s and Cavalli
Molinelli’s parties. During this period, the wind likely pushed
the freely drifting sea ice back to the area eastwards, at a distance
similar to the westward movement due to strong easterly winds
from 18–20 March. Hence, this blizzard probably contributed to
save Cavalli Molinelli’s party from meeting the fate of Querini’s
team. This is because, unbeknownst to them, the blizzard likely
moved the ice underneath back to a point somewhere north of
Prince Rudolf Island while they had to lay still on the ice.
However, as mentioned above, this blizzard in combination with
the ice drift was possibly the most likely cause of Querini,
Støkken, and Ollier’s disappearance, because, similar to the other
two parties, the harsh weather would have prevented them from
travelling further even though their supplies were running out.
After this blizzard, the second returning detachment did not report
any substantial problems and was finally able to reach Prince
Rudolf Island on 18 April. At the time, due to the open water
around the island, their boat was a fundamental instrument facili-
tating their rescue (Cavalli Molinelli, 1903).
Cagni’s party could continue northwards, generally covering
comfortable daily distances on good ice, until reaching their far-
thest north point at 86°34’N on April 24, before a lack of supplies
forced them to return. At this point, Cagni could finally observe his
longitude at 64°30’E, slightly east of the Teplitz Bay. Hence, Cagni
must have been highly satisfied by following his rule of thumb of
treading only slightly to the east to compensate for the long-term
ice drift. However, his return journey to the south presented sub-
stantial problems with the ice drift.
On 25 April, Cagni’s team began their southwards journey with
provisions for 30 days containing 200 rations of pemmican and 300
rations of dog food for 34 dogs (di Savoia, 1903). During their
return journey, Cagni measured his longitude for the first time
on 9 May and found that they were at 50°E and had drifted west-
wards by almost 60 geographical miles (111 km) from their farthest
north. Around the end of April, when Cagni’s team faced three
days of strong and continual south-easterly winds, he rightly sus-
pected that the winds could have driven them westwards (Cagni,
1903, p.507). This was evidently a serious deviation from their opti-
mal course, partly because it prolonged the distance towards their
returning point and especially because they now had to tread more
pronouncedly towards the east to offset the westerly drift.
Cagni’s narratives notably reported the results of his longi-
tudinal measurements during his return journey in terms of hours,
minutes, and seconds, rather than using the more common format
of degrees, minutes, and seconds. This is because longitudinal
sights are fundamentally dependent on the time difference between
the current location and Greenwich (Bowditch, 1938). However, it
is easy to translate between the hour and the degree longitude for-
mats because there are 24 hours in a day and 360 degrees in a circle;
hence, the sun appears to move across the sky at a rate of 360/
24= 15° per hour. Thus, on 9 May, when Cagni measured the lon-
gitude for the first time, he observed that he was 3 h, 19min, and 58
s east of Greenwich, corresponding to 49.992° in the decimal form,
or 49°59'31''E in the traditional sexagesimal degree format, which
Cagni rounded off to an even 50°E.
After having discovered the westwards drift, Cagni’s team spent
over a month trying to come back eastwards or at least to avoid
being transported further to the west, often with little hope of suc-
cess, as vividly documented in Cagni’s narrative. They desperately
needed to return to the south, while also offsetting the effects of the
westerly ice drift. Three weeks later, on 29 May, they were at the
same latitude as their base camp in Tepliz Bay but 50 geographical
miles (93 km) to the west in terms of the longitude. After an
extreme effort and many forced marches, they reached the shore
of Ommanney Island on 13 June, approximately 30 geographical
miles (56 km) southwest of Teplitz Bay. Ten days later they finally
returned to their main camp on Prince Rudolf Island, where their
friends waited despite having almost given up hope for their return.
Conclusion
It is difficult to conclude with certainty what happened to Querini,
Støkken, and Ollier during their return march, due to the lack of
any physical evidence. Their disappearance has several possible
causes. However, as this study showed, the most likely course of
events seems to be that the blizzard during 18–20 March had
moved the pack ice underneath their feet much further west than
they realised when they began their return journey. This, combined
with the four-day blizzard in early April that prevented them from
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travelling, likely lead to death by starvation after running out of
supplies and not finding their way back to the base camp.
Some studies have already suggested the hypothesis about the
first returning detachment starving to death; however, such a
hypothesis was generally proposed at a speculative level without
any supporting analysis. For example, Fiala (1906, p.6) thought
that the crew probably starved to death, simply because the harsh
icy conditions prevented them from covering sufficient distances
to enable them to survive on their food and fuel supplies.
Albanov (2000, p.160) also claimed that they ‘died of starvation
along the way’, without substantial support. Bryce (1910, p.268)
speculated that the ice drift during their return march made it
impossible for them to reach Prince Rudolf Island before running
out of food. However, the idea that Querini’s party’s disappearance
could be explained through the faulty estimation of their position
because of the ice drift during the blizzard 18–20 March, causing
them begin their return journey from a point much further to the
west than they thought, has not yet been proposed in the extant
literature.
Interestingly, di Savoia’s narrative entirely evaded speculations
about the fate of Querini’s party. Although di Savoia clearly must
have contemplated about these events during the final months in
camp on Prince Rudolf Island, his narrative did not contain any
reflection about it beyond a general belief about some sort of accident
preventing their safe return. In fact, he even thought that it was ‘use-
less to attempt to seek why they failed to return’ (di Savoia, 1903,
p.341). Perhaps a psychological approach could be used in future
research to cast further light on this avoidant attitude.
After their disappearance, Støkken’s father was the last known
person to attempt to find the missing party or seek closure on their
disappearance (Horn, 1930). In 1901, Captain Støkken led a
Norwegian search expedition in the sealer Capella, travelling to
Cape Flora and along the southern coasts of Franz Josef Land.
However, he could not find any trace of his son and his team
members.
Notably, the missing party members were appropriately hon-
oured posthumously. For example, in 1929, a crew of the
Russian steam icebreaker Sedov erected a memorial tablet in
Teplitz Bay to honour Querini, Støkken, and Ollier when they vis-
ited the location (Wiese, 1929). In addition, a small island in the
Franz Josef Land archipelago, just east of the cape on Jackson
Island where Nansen and Johansen spent the winter of 1895–
1896, was christened Querini Island. Two capes in southern
Jackson Island were also named Cape Støkken and Cape Ollier.
Finally, even though modern scientific knowledge sometimes
can be applied in relation to different historical polar expeditions
in order to increase the understanding of them, it is important to
note that the analyses of actual decision making during such expe-
ditions must rely on the scientific knowledge at the time. Hence,
this study should be taken primarily as an attempt to initiate fur-
ther discussion and research about the reasons for the outcomes of
different polar expeditions during the Heroic Age, rather than as
criticism of di Savoia and his expedition.
Conflict of interest. None.
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